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"It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limits, for fair housing throughout the United
'2
States.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1968, the United States Congress enacted Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act, also referred to as the Fair
Housing Act (FHA). Adhering to the broad goal cited
above, Congress sought to eliminate various types of
discrimination in the provision and exchange of housICandidate for JurisDoctorate,Washington and Lee School
of Law, May 1996. 1 wish to thank Professor Laura S.Fitzgerald
for her encouragement and guidance in the development of
this article and Michael J. B. Schaff for his patient editorial
assistance
and helpful comments.
2The
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994)
3Id.at §3605.
4Id. at §3606.

ing. To achieve that end, the statute specifically prohibits
discrimination in certain contexts, including any residential real estate transactions3 and the provision of brokerage
services In addition, section 3604(a) states that it shall
be unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of
a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."s Because of the breadth of this language,
courts have interpreted section 3604 (a) to encompass discrimination in many types of housing practices. 6 At least

-1d. at §3604(a) (emphasisadded). Other sections of the
FHAs substantive provisions contain this or similar language.
See ScHwEMM, ROBERT G., HOUSING

DISCRMINATION LAW

48 n.20

(1983) (citing the same language in sections 3604(b), 3605,
and 3631(a),
and similar language in sections 3606 and 3617).
6
See SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 48 (identifying exclusionary zoning, steering, and redlining as a few of the practices
that courts have held to be prohibited by the language in section 3604(a)).

one commentator has referred to the section as the most
important substantive provision of the FHA.'
Despite both its breadth and apparent importance,
the language of section 3604(a) is surprisingly ambiguous. The FIA does not define the phrase "because of
race."8 Thus, the statute does not dearly indicate what
level of intent a defendant must possess in order to be
found guilty of violating the statute.9 As a result of this
ambiguity, the FHA provides little guidance to potential plaintiffs regarding the allegations they must make
in order to satisfy their initial or prima fade burden of
proof under the statute' 0 Litigation of claims under the
FHA has helped clarify, to some extent, the levels of
proof required of plaintiffs to establish FHA claims, and
thus the meaning of section 3604(a). All courts accept
the proposition that this language does implicate actions
motivated by discriminatory intent." In addition, a majority of federal courts have recited their beliefs that
actions not motivated by discriminatory intent may still
fall within the scope of section 3604(a) if they have a
disparate impact on a class of people protected by the
2
statute.'
However, despite the seemingly uniform acceptance
of this principle, the various federal circuits have adopted
different formulations of the primafaciestandard imposed
upon plaintiffs.'3 These standards generally resemble one
of two models: the "effect-only" standard or the "four-factors" standard. 14 Soon after the adoption of the FHA, some
commentators and courts initially considered the difference between the two standards to be minimal.' More
recent judicial opinions suggest that the difference between
6
the two standards may be more significant'
This paper compares the judicial discussion of the
model prima fade standards in order to highlight the
differences between the two.Through an analysis of more

7See id. at 47 (referring to section 3604(a) as the FHA's
"most important provision").
8 See id. at 48-49, 53, 105 (discussing
the meaning of the
phrase "because of race" in the FHA)..
9See id. at 52 (asking whether a violation of Title VIII
may be sustained where "a defendant's motivation is entirely
innocent, but his action produces a discriminatory effect").
10 This intitial burden is often referred to as the primafacie burden. Both case law and commentators have widely accepted the notion that FHA claims should be analyzed using

the primafacie model. See, eg., infra note 32 and accompany-

ing text.
" See, e.g., id. at 53 (stating that the phrase "because of
race""would apply when the sole reason for a defendant's action [was] ...race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...");
Robert G. Schwemm, DiscriminatoryEffect and the FairHousing Act, 54 NorsE DAME LAw. 199, 204 (1978); John Stick,
Comment, Justifying A DiscriminatoryEffect Under The Fair
HousingAct:A Search For The ProperStandard,27 U.C.L.A. L.

REv.398, 399 (1978). Cases which seek to prove defendant
possessed discriminatory intent are often referred to as "disparate treatment cases".

recent cases, it also shows that the choice of standards
may reflect differing interpretations of the FHA by various federal courts and that the application of the two
standards may lead to different outcomes.1 7Specifically,
Section II analyzes and compares the two model prima

facie formulations as they were first adopted by the federal judiciary. Section III reviews some of the sources of
authority that courts have used to justify their adoption
of the various primafacie formulations. Section IV analyzes several recent judicial opinions which suggest that
the choice of primafade standards may reflect differing
interpretations of the FHA by reviewing courts, and that
application of one standard over the other may change
the outcome in a given case. Finally, Section IV condudes that based upon these differences in interpretation and effect, the "effect-only" standard should be
adopted as the sole primafade standard utilized in analyzing FHA claims. Through the uniform adoption of
this standard, the federal judiciary can insure that the
broad scope of the FHA is preserved and that the statute remains a vital piece of modem civil rights legislation.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMA FACIE STANDARDS APPLIED TO DISPARATE IMPACT
CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
A. The Split is Noted Within the Ninth Circuit

Recently, two district courts within the Ninth Circuit decided disparate impact cases brought under the
FHA. In FairHousing Council of Orange County,Inc. v.

Ayres,' 8 the plaintiff, a non-profit corporation promoting equal opportunity in housing, challenged the legal12 See infra Section II(B). These cases are often referred to
as "disparate
impact" cases.
3
U
See infra Section II(D) (identifying the primafaciestandards presently utilized by the different federal circuits). "
14See infra Sections I(B) ("effect-only) and II(C) ("four-

factors").
5
1 See Schwemm, supra note 10, at 257 (stating "[t]he difference in these two methods of analyzing an effect case under Title VIII may not be particularly significant in terms of
producing difference results"); ResidentAdvisory Boardv.Rizzo,
564 E2d 122, 148 n.32 (3d. Cir. 1977) (stating"[w]e read the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Arlington Heights II [applying the
"four-factors" standard as requiring no more than we do in
order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. .. ").The
Rizzo 6court adopted an "effect-only" prima facie standard. Id.
1 See infra Section IV.
'7See infra Sections IV(A) (discussing ability of courts to

narrow scope of FHA through the adoption of one standard
over the other), V(B) (comparing the application of different
standards by the majority and dissent in the same case, producing opposite outcomes).
18855 F.Supp. 315 (C.D. Cal 1994).

ity of a two-person per unit occupancy restriction im-

posed by the defendant landlord.' 9 In United States v.
Weiss,20 the Government brought suit on behalf of itself
and two private persons challenging a similar occupancy
restriction.2 ' In both cases, the district courts noted the
split in the federal circuits regarding the appropriate
prima facie standard to be applied to disparate impact
claims brought under the FHA. 2 Ultimately, the Fair
Housing Council court adopted an "effect-only" standard
while the Weiss court, despite extensively discussing the
merits of the proper standard, avoided the issue, decid3
ing the case on other grounds23
More important than the analysis of either, both
courts concluded that the federal circuits were indeed
undecided over the appropriate standard. 24 In addition,
the FairHousingCouncilcourt specifically identified the
split as one between those circuits adopting the "effectonly" standard and those adopting the "four-factors" approach. 25 This recognition by FairHousing Council and
Weiss provides a useful introduction to the conflict surrounding the question of the proper prima fade stan'9 See Fair Housing Council Of Orange County, Inc. v.
Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (granting
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and holding that discriminatory effect, alone, would be sufficient to satisfy
plaintiff's primafade burden in a FHA case). In FairHousing
Council,plaintiff alleged that defendant-landlords' occupancy
restriction violated section 3604(b) of the FHA. Id. at 316.
The district court had determined that the key issue in the
case was whether the FHA required that plaintiffs "also demonstrate defendant's intent to discriminate... ." Id. at 317.
On review, the court of appeals first noted that the federal
circuits had not yet agreed upon a single primafacie standard.
Id. The court characterized the split as one between those circuits that held proof of discriminatory effect was "always sufficient to establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act", and
those circuits which "requir[ed] consideration of four factors,
including intent." Id. Ultimately, the court accepted the "effect-only" standard. Id. at 318. Applying that standard to the
case before it, and noting the defendant's lack of rebuttal evidence, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary
adjudication. Id. at 319.
20847 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. Nev. 1994).
2
See United States v.Weiss, 847 F.Supp. 819, 831 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because
defendant's evidence sufficiently rebutted plaintiffs primafacie case, regardless oftheprimafaciestandard imposed. In Weiss,
the plaintiffs alleged defendant's occupancy restriction prevented traditional families with children from renting units in
defendant's apartment complex, thereby violating section
3604(a) of the FHA).Id. at 822. The court of appeals identified a central issue in the case as "whether [the FHA] require[d]
proof of the landlord's intentional discrimination or whether
the statute is violated also where no such intention is established but where the conduct can be shown to have a discriminatory effect. Id. at 826. In seeking to determine the appropriate standard, the court noted the split in the circuits regarding
the appropriate standard. Id. However, rather than choosing
to apply one primafacie standard, the court determined that

dard for disparate impact claims brought under the FHA.
In order to further explain the primafacie concept in
FHA cases and to highlight the distinctions between the
two primary approaches, the following two subsections
examine the seminal opinions which first adopted and
applied the two model primafacie standards.
B. The "Effect-only" Standard
At least four federal circuits to date have adopted the
"effect-only" standard.26 The Eighth and Third Circuit
Courts ofAppeals first applied this standard in UnitedStates
2
v. City ofBlack Jack 27 and ResidentAdvisory Boardv. Rizzo.
These opinions are discussed below.
1. United States v. City of Black Jack
In United States v. City of Black Jack,29 the United
States appealed the decision of the district court refusing to enjoin the adoption of a zoning ordinance by the
city of Black Jack.30 Once adopted, the ordinance pre-

under either the"effect-only" or the "four-factor" standard, the
defendant had sufficiently rebutted plaintiffs prima fade evidence. Id. at 831. For that reason, the court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id.
2 See supra notes 18 and 20.
23 See supra notes 18 and 20.
24 See Weiss at 826 (stating that "several decisions are inconsistent with each other; others are incomplete in significant respects; and still others so not distinguish between the
relevant concepts.

. ."

and additionally, that "there is a variety

of opinion, usually not reconciled in any systemic fashion, [as
to] whether a violation may be predicated solely on proof...
[of] ... discriminatory effect)"); FairHousing Council at 317
(stating "[o]ther circuits have split on whether intent must be
proven.., to establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act').
25 See FairHousing Council at 317 (noting the two standards differ in that one requires proof of intent ("the fourfactors") while the other does not ("effect-only').
26See infra Section II(D) (noting the adoption of the "effect-only" standard by the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits); infra note 93 (discussing the present uncertainty
regarding the choice of standards in the Third Circuit).
27508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
28564 F.2d 122 (3d. Cir. 1977).
29508
F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
3
°See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179,
1187 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding the city's zoning ordinance violated the FHA because it had a discriminatory effect on blacks
living in the St. Louis metropolitan area. In Black Jack, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's
holding that the zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Black
Jack did not deny persons housing on the basis of race. Id. at
1181. On appeal, appellants reasserted their allegations that
the zoning ordinance violated the FHA both because it had a
discriminatory effect on blacks and because its passage was
motivated by discriminatory intent. See id. at 1184 (stating a
prima fade case may be established by showing that the
defendant's conduct had a discriminatory effect); id. at 1185

vented the completion of a low and middle-income housing project.3 ' The government alleged, in part, that the
challenged ordinance violated section 3604 (a) of the
Fair Housing Act because it "denied persons housing on
the basis of race."32
In beginning its review, the court of appeals first noted
that analysis of FHA cases, and thus the plaintiff's burden
of proof,should be governed by the primafacie concept.3
Under such a concept, the plaintiff's primafade burden
could be satisfied by either a showing of discriminatory
effect or discriminatory intent?' The court then argued
that permitting the use of an "effect-only" standard was
necessary because of both the ability of actors to hide the
true intentions of their actions and the significance of the
harm that could result from actions not motivated by conscious racial animus, but having a discriminatory effect on
a protected class of people, nonetheless.35 The court reasoned that interpreting the scope of the FHA in such a
broad fashion was consistent with the authority of the
Thirteenth 36Amendment under which Congress adopted
the statute.

After its extensive review of the appropriate legal
analysis to be applied to such FHA claims, the Black Jack
court reviewed the district court's conclusion that the evidence presented in the case did not justify a finding of
discriminatory effect.3 7 The district court had appraised
the effect of the ordinance simply by assessing the racial
makeup of the class of potential residents that might live
n.3 (noting plaintiffs allegation that the zoning ordinance was
violative of the FHA because its adoption was motivated by
racial purpose and the validity of such an allegation in establishing a FHA violation). Applying an "effect-only"prima fade
standard, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs evidence
did have such a discriminatory effect and that the defendant
had failed to rebut such a showing. Id. at 1186-87. For those
reasons, the court struck down the ordinance for violating sections313604(a) and 3617 of the FHA. Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1181.
321d. at 1181 (stating that by preventing the construction
of the Park View project through the enactment of a new zoning ordinance, the City had "denied persons housing on the
basis of race, in violation of section 3604 (a)" of the federal
Fair Housing
Act).
33
Id. (citing Williams v.Matthews Co., 499 E2d 819, 826
(8th Cir. 1974).
34 Id. at 1184 (noting that "[t]o establish a prima fade
case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff need prove no more
than that the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably
results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a
discriminatory effect"). See also id. at 1185, n.3 (recognizing
that while the plaintiff has also alleged that the ordinance was
"enacted for the purpose of excluding blacks ... nevertheless,
we do not base our conclusion that [it] violates Title VIII on a
finding
that there was an improper purpose").
35
Id. at 1185 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401,497 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (1969) (en banc)) (explaining that "[e]ffect, and not
motivation, is the touchstone, in part because 'whatever our
law once was,... we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary

in the proposed housing development. 8 Because this class
would include an equal number of blacks and whites presently living in the metropolitan area, the lower court concluded that the prohibition of the project by the zoning
ordinance would not have a disproportionate effect on
39
blacks, and therefore, was not violative of the FHA.
The Eighth Circuit court rejected the analysis of the
lower court, offering its own analysis, utilizing a broader
definition of discriminatory effect.40 Under its examination, the court noted that the challenged ordinance
would preclude eighty-five percent of the black residents
in the area from living in the city of Black Jack, and that
without the completion of the housing project, the city's
population would remain almost entirely white. 4' Based
on its findings, that the ordinance would maintain the
racial exclusivity of city of Black Jack and perpetuate a
condition of gross segregation within the St. Louis metropolitan area, the Black Jack court concluded that the
42
zoning ordinance did produce a discriminatory effect.
With this evidence, the plaintiffs had successfully
satis4
fied their primafacie burden under the FHA. 1
Satisfaction of the initialprimafacieburden, however,
did not determine the outcome ofthe case Under its model
of the primafacie concept, the court of appeals noted that
once the plaintiff had satisfied its primafade burden, the
defendant could rebut this showing by offering a "compelling governmental interest" which might justify the discriminatory effect of the city's actions.44 While the dequality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to
private rights and the public interest as the perversity of awilful
scheme'").
36
Id.at 1184. It was this authority, the court asserted,
which permitted it to "[curb] the discretion of local zoning
officials.. where 'the clear resultof such discretion [was] the
segregation of low-income Blacks from all White neighborhoods.'"
Id.
37
Id. at 1186.
38

1d.

See id. (summarizing the district court's finding which
based its statistical data on the number of residents with yearly
earning within the range that the proposed housing project
was intended to appeal to).
"Id.
41
Id.
3

42Id.

43Id. at 1186.
44Id. In a footnote, the Black Jack court noted that this
"compelling interest" rebuttal standard was also applied in
Equal Protection cases. Id. at 1186, n.4. At the time of the
decision, the Supreme Court had yet to hold that Equal Protection cases required proof of discriminatory intent. See Comment, A Last Stand On Arlington Heights: Title VIII And The

Requirement Of DiscriminatoryIntent, 53 N.YU. L. REv. 150,
161-62 (discussing Title VIII jurisprudence prior to the Washington v. Davis opinion, which held that evidence of discriminatory intent was necessary to establish an Equal Protection
violation). This may explain the Black Jack court's decision to
apply the Equal Protection rebuttal standard in analyzing its

FHA claim.

fendant did offer such evidence in this case, the court of
appeals concluded it was insufficient to rebut the

found that the deplaintiffs evidence, and, therefore,
45
fendants had violated the FHA.

2. Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo
In ResidentAdvisoryBoardv.Rizzo,46 various individuals
and organizations brought a successful class action alleging that the City of Philadelphia and other state and federal agencies had violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the FHA, by failing to complete the construction of a proposed low-income housing project. 47 The defendants appealed the district court's decision which found them guilty of both
constitutional and statutory violations. 48 In its review of
the district cour's holdings, the court of appeals noted that
in order to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
the plaintiff had to show not only that the defendant's
actions had a "disproportionate impact" on them, but that
the defendant had also acted with "invidious discriminatory purpose." 49 By contrast, the court of appeals held that
proof of discriminatory effect, alone, would suffice to sat-

isfy the primafacie burden for FHA claims°
The Rizzo court offered three arguments in support
of its conclusion regarding the FHA prima facie stan4SId.at

1188.
46564 F.2d 122 (3d. Cir.1977).
47 See
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 122,
149 (3d. Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs had successfully
maintained a primafacdecase of housing discrimination under
the FHA by showing defendant's actions produced a discriminatory effect and that defendants failed to rebut such a showing). In Rizzo, plaintiffs alleged that while the City had condemned and cleared the property on which theWhitman Park
Townhouse housing project was to be located, it had since
delay[ed] and frustrat[ed]" the completion of the project. Id.
The class of people represented by the suit included "all low
income minority persons residing in the City of Philadelphia
who, by virtue of their race, [were] unable to secure decent,
safe and sanitary housing, outside of areas of minority concentration, and who would be eligible to reside in the Whitman
project. Id. at 139.
After an extensive review of the facts leading up to
the case before it, the court held that "a Title VIII claim must
rest, in the first instance, upon a showing that the challenged
action by [the] defendant had a racially discriminatory effect",
id. at 148, and that the plaintiffs had made such a showing. Id.

at 126. As in Black Jack, the court did note that the defendant
could rebut a primafacie showing by offering some evidence
justifying the discriminatory effect. Id. at 150. However, unlike the Eighth Circuit, the court chose not to adopt a particular standard, instead, deferring the definition of such criteria
to the discretion of the district courts, where it would be determined on "a [should ] emerge... on a case-by-case basis."
Id. at 149.
481d. at 129.
' 9 See id. at 143 n.23 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976)) (recognizing that discriminatory effect, alone,

dard. First, the court recognized that in Metropolitan
Housing Corporationv. Village ofArlington Heights,1I the
Supreme Court had applied a heightened prima facie
standard requiring proof of discriminatory intent to the
Equal Protection claims before it, but did not offer a
similar holding regarding the appropriate standard under the FHA.5 2 Instead, the Court remanded the
plaintiff's FHA claims for determination by the circuit
court. 13 Thus, the Rizzo court reasoned, since the Supreme Court chose not to apply an intent-based prima
fade standard to the FHA claims while doing so in its
analysis of the Equal Protection claims before it, the

prima facie standard for FHA claims need not require
proof of discriminatory intent.-4 The Rizzo court also
noted that both the legislative history of Title VIII, like
that of Title VII, supported a broad interpretation of the
FHA.s s Finally, the Rizzo court found persuasive, the

opinions of several other circuit courts, which held that
evidence of discriminatory effect was sufficient to sat-

isfy the primafacie standard under Title VIII."s
Applying its analysis to the facts before it, the Rizzo
court recognized that as a result of the efforts to prepare the Whitman site for development, the area's black
population had been almost completely decimated.57 The
court reasoned that this effect, alone, was sufficient to
establish a FHA violation.5 8 Further, the court also recwill rarely be sufficient to establish an Equal Protection violation)).
SSee id.at 145 (concluding that the recent Supreme Court
opinion, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976), in which the Court held
proof of discriminatory intent was necessary to maintain an
Equal Protection violation but remanded analysis of the FHA,
suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment and the FHA were
not coextensive).
5
Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976), remanded 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir.1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1977).
52
See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 140, 147 (discussing the Supreme

Court's holding in Arlington).
S31d. at 147.
SId. at 147-48.
55
See id. at 147 (comparing the legislative history of Title
VII and Title VIII).
"6See id. at 148 (citing Metropolitan Housing Develop-

ment Corp. v.Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington I), 558
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536
F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179,1185 (8th Cir. 1974); citing also Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n., Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108,
114 (2d Cir. 1970)).
5 1d. at 149 (stating that"[w]hereas originally almost 45%
of the families living in the Whitman project area were black,
by the time urban renewal clearance was completed and the
surrounding blocks reconstructed, virtually no black families
were to be found in the area")..

"Id.

ognized that the impact of the decision to terminate the
project would have a disproportionately high impact on
blacks as a class since they represented a substantial proportion of the residents eligible to live in the housing
project.5 9 The court of appeals found these effects sufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs primafacie burden under
the FHA.60
Following the framework utilized in Black Jack, the
Rizzo court then assessed the defendant's rebuttal evidence.6 Unlike Black Jack, however, the Rizzo court did
not borrow the "compelling interest" rebuttal standard
from Equal Protection jurisprudence- 62The Rizzo court
also rejected the proposition of adopting a "business necessity" standard similar to that applied by courts in Title
VII cases.63 Instead, the court concluded that rebuttal
evidence should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and
offered some suggested guidelines to guide such considerations.6s Concluding that the defendant had offered
no justification for the challenged actions, the court held
that the plaintiffs had proved an FHA violation.65
C The "Four-factors"Standard
At least two federal circuit courts have held that
plaintiffs must prove something beyond mere discriminatory effect in order to establish a primafacie case under the Fair Housing Act, though how much more remains unclear. In analyzing disparate impact FHA claims,
59 Id. (noting that "the impact of the governmental
defendant's termination of the project [would be felt] primarily by blacks, who make up a substantial proportion of those
who would be eligible to reside [in the housing project]").
0
661
Id.

Id. at 149-50.

62Id. at 148. Rizzo was decided after Washington v. Davis,

which held that evidence of discriminatory intent was necessary to establish a violation of the Equal Protection dause.
See id. at 140-41 (discussing the effects of the Washingtonopin-

ion on Equal Protection and Title VIII jurisprudence). See generally Comment, supra note 43, at 161-62 (discussing Title
VIII jurisprudence before and after Washington v. Davis). Because the primafade standard for constitutional claims required
evidence of discriminatory intent after Washington v. Davis,
rather than the lesser proof of discriminatory effect, the Rizzo
court did not believe the constitutional rebuttal standard should
be applied to Title VIII cases. Rizzo at 148.
'ld. at 148-49.
64 Id. at 149. In particular, the Rizzo court considered
whether the defendant's justifications served a "egitimate" and
"bona fide" interest and whether there was any "alternative
course of action" which might have been taken, which might
have had a lessor discriminatory impact. Id.
65

1d. at 150.

6558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
67
See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington fl), 558 F.2d 1283, 129094 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that discriminatory effect, alone,
would be sufficient to establish a FHA claim under certain

these courts have applied a "four-factors" standard requiring proof of discriminatory effect and considering
several other factors including evidence of discriminatory intent, if there is any.The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals first developed and applied the "four-factors"
standard in MetropolitanHousing Development Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington10.66

In Arlington II, the court reviewed the plaintiffs allegations that the village's refusal to rezone plaintiffs
property violated the FHA. 67 Prior to the court's receipt
of the case on remand, the Supreme Court had decided
the plaintiffs Equal Protection claims holding that evidence of discriminatory intent was necessary to establish a constitutional violation, and that the plaintiffs had
failed to meet such a standard. 6s On remand, the Seventh Circuit divided its review of the plaintiffs FHA
claims into two parts. First, the court determined
whether a showing of discriminatory effect could ever
be sufficient to support finding a violation of the Fair
Housing Act.69 Then, the court described the circumbe sufficient
stances under which such evidence would
70
to justify finding a statutory violation.
At the outset of these two inquiries, the Arlington II court acknowledged that Congress had
7
intended for Title VIII to be interpreted broadly. '
Thus, the court reasoned, it should construe the
statute broadly in order to effectuate Congress' intent.7 The court also noted that while the Supreme Court

circumstances, but remanding case to district court to analyze
plaintiffs claims under a"four-factor"standard which included
consideration of intent evidence). In Arlington II, the Seventh
Circuit determined whether the defendant's failure to rezone
plaintiffs property, thereby precluding plaintifffrom constructing a low-income housing development, violated the FHA. Id.
at 1285. In its decision above, the Supreme Court held that
proof of discriminatory intent was necessary to establish an
Equal Protection violation and that plaintiffs had failed to meet
such a standard. Id. at 1287. On remand, the court of appeals
posed two questions: whether proof of discriminatory effect
was sufficient to establish a FHA violation, and, if so, was such
evidence sufficient in this instance. Id. at 1288.
Ultimately, the court held that mere proof of discriminatory effect could suffice to establish a statutory claim under
certain circumstances,id. at 1290, but remanded such assess-

ment in this case for determination by the district court. Id. at
1294. However, the court of appeals offered four factors to be
considered by the district court in making such a determination. Id. at 1290. This paper refers to these factors as the"fourfactors" primafacie standard.
68Id.
69Id.
70
1d.
71

d. at 1289. The Arlington 11 court recognized that other
courts had inferred from congressional statement of policy in
Title VIII that the statute should be interpreted broadly as
well. Id.
71Id. The Arlington 1H court declined "to take a narrow
view" of the statute "[i]n light of the declaration of congres-

had required proof of discriminatory intent to establish a
constitutional violation in Washington v. Davis,the Davis
court had reaffirmed the application of a lesser standard
in cases brought under Title VII,the federal civil rights
statute dealing with employment discrimination? 3 Noting the similarities in both the language and the purposes of Titles VII and VIII, and mindful of Congress'
intent that both statutes be interpreted broadly,the court
of appeals concluded that evidence of discriminatory
effect, alone, could establish a violation of the FHA under certain circumstances.7 4
In order to determine when such circumstances were
present, the court compiled a "four-factor" inquiry to
guide its analysis. 75 The court claimed to have gleaned
the factors from prior disparate impact FHA cases.76 The
court summarized the four factors as follows:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) isthere some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis; (3) what
is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) does the plaintiff seek to compel
the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for
members of minority groups or merely to restrain
the defendant from interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such housing."

sional intent provided by section 3601 [of the FHA,] and the
need to construe the Act expansively in order to implement
that goal." Id.
73See id. at 1288 (noting the Supreme Court's affirmation of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) in
Washington v. Davis, 426, U.S. 229 (1976)).
74 Id.
at 1290. The Arlington II court concluded that "at
least under some circumstances a violation of section 3604(a)
[could] be established by a showing of discriminatory effect
without
a showing of discriminatory intent."
75
Id.
76 d. at 1290.
7id. The court offered some explanation of the four factors. The court recognized two types of discriminatory effect:
either a "greater adverse effect" on a particular group as compared to others or the general effect of the action on the surrounding community as a whole, such as the perpetuation of
segregation. Id.The court also noted that evidence of discriminatory intent could bolster a plaintiffs claims of discriminatory effect, though such evidence was not necessary, and thus,
this factor was the least important to the overall inquiry. Id. at
1292. As to the interest of the defendant, the court noted that
more deference should be given to governmental bodies acting within their authority than to those acting beyond their
authority or private parties acting to further private goals. Id.
at 1293. Finally, the court counseled reluctance towards granting relief where such would force defendants to take affirmative steps towards remedying discrimination as opposed to relief which would merely prevent a defendant from interfering
with a plaintiff's efforts to construct such housing. Id.

Despite its extensive discussion of the proper
method for analyzing the case before it, the court of
appeals concluded that it lacked sufficient evidence to
make a final determination. 8 For this reason, the court
remanded the case to the district court to apply its "fourfactors" analysis and determine the outcome of the case. 9

After Arlington II, several issues regarding the application of the "four-factors" standard remained unclear.
The ArlingtonII court offered little guidance concerning
how to assess or weigh evidence of the individual factors in order to determine whether the FHA was vio-

lated.80 Also, subsequent cases have not clearly indicated
how or whether the Arlington II "factors" should be incorporated into the typical prima facie analysis, such as
that applied in Rizzo.8 1Finally, some commentators and

courts have suggested that the "four-factors" standard
was not intended to be applied as a prima facie test at
all, but rather, was intended to guide the assessment of
the merits in FHA cases.82

At the very least, a superficial analysis of the standards suggests that because evidence of discriminatory
effect is only one factor to be considered under the "fourfactors" analysis, not every plaintiff producing such evidence, without more, will succeed in maintaining a FHA
claim under the Arlington II standard.83 By contrast, un-

der the "effect-only" standard, comparable evidence will
be sufficient both to satisfy the plaintiff's prima facie

78

d. at 1294.
Id.
" See Comment, supra note 43, at 170 (discussing the
"[i]nadequacies of the Arlington Heights [four-factor] standard).
"IThe Rizzo court did comment on the Arlington I factors, but did not suggest that they should be incorporated into
its "effect-only" analysis. See Rizzo, 564 F2d at 148 n.32 (discussing the Arlington IIopinion). However, at least one commentator has interpreted teh Rizzo courts discussion ofArlington Ilto mean that Rizzo did intend for the"four-factors" analysis
to be incorporated into its "effect-only" formula. See Terri A.
Bjorn, Recent Decisions,46 GEO.WAsH. L. REv. 615,626 (summarizing the FHA analysis proscribed by the court in Rizzo).
8Z See Schwemm, supra note 11, at 257 (citing the Rizzo
court's belief that the Seventh Circuit's approach [in Arlington II] simply set forth 'a standard upon which ultimate Title
VIII relief may be predicated, rather than indicating the point
at which the evidentiary burden of justifying a discriminatory
effect will shift to the defendant"). Thus, the Arlington II factors may not have been intended to establish a primafaciestandard at all. Nonetheless, recent opinions suggest that the Arlington IIstandard has been interpreted to be a primafaciestandard. See infra Sections II(A), 11(D). See also Stick, supra note
10, at 408 (comparing the primafacie standards from Rizzo,
Black Jack, and Arlington If).
83 See Arlington II, 558 F.2d at 1290 (The court's statement that a FHA violation may be supported by evidence of
discriminatory effect "under some circumstances" implies that
under other circumstances, such evidence will not be sufficient.)
79

burden, and, in some instances, to successfully establish
an FHA violation. 84

D. Summary of PresentApproaches
Judge Harold Greene of the District Court for the
District of Columbia offered one of the most accurate
assessments of the jurisprudence addressing the appropriate prima facie standard for FHA claims when he

stated:
[w]hile, to be sure, proof of discriminatory intent by
the landlord seems everywhere to be regarded as establishing a violation of the [Fair Housing Act] ....
,there is a variety of opinion, usually not reconciled
in any systemic fashion, whether a violation may
also be predicated solely on proof that the landlords
actions had a discriminatory effect ....
85
Interestingly, Judge Green has offered one of the most
restrictive interpretations of the FHA to date. In Brown
v. Artery Organization,86 Judge Greene suggested that
there should be no uniform primafacie standard under
the Fair Housing Act."7 Rather, courts should sustain

" See Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184 (stating "[t]o establish
a prima facie case of racial discrimination [in aTitle VIII case],
the plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct of the
defendant actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect); Rizzo,
564 F.2d at 148 (determining"that discriminatory effect alone
will, if proved, establish a Title VIII prima facie case-.. ; [ultimately], if the Title VIII prima fade case is not rebutted, a
violation is proved").
Nonetheless, both courts also noted that satisfaction of
the primafade standard merely shifted the burden of production to the defendant, to offer some evidence that might rebut
the plaintiffs claims. See BlackJack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (noting
upon plaintiff's satisfaction of the prima facie standard, burden shifts to the defendant to justify the challenged conduct);
Rizzo, 546 F.2d at 149 (noting that merely satisfying the prima
fade burden does not guarantee success on the merits but
merely triggers defendant's burden to offer a justify the actions in question).
8
sBrown v. Artery Organization, 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1114
(D.C. Dist. Col. 1987).
86654 F.Supp. 1106 D.C. Dist. Col. 1987).
"See Brown v.Artery Org., Inc., 654 P.Supp. 1106, 1118
(D.C. Dist. Col. 1987) (holding plaintiffs were entitled to a
preliminary injunction preventing their eviction because they
had presented circumstantial evidence sufficient to suggest that
defendants were acting with discriminatory purpose; such proof
of intent was required where defendant was a private organization and not a governmental body). In Brown, plaintiffs challenged defendant's attempts to evict overwhelmingly minority tenants of a low-rent apartment complex in order to raise
rents on the units. Id. at 1108. The court note that the prima
fade standard for plaintiffs bringing claims under the FHA
should vary depending upon the status of the defendant. Id. at

claims brought against governmental defendants
where only evidence of discriminatory effect is produced, but require some proof of discriminatory intent in cases involving private defendants."8 While
unique in his approach to the question of the appropriate prima fade standard, Judge Greene's opinion
fails to cite any statutory or judicial authority for his
distinction between classes of defendants.
Every other circuit, with the exception of the
Eleventh, has adopted one of the two primafaciestandards discussed in the preceding sections, or some
similar version. The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have all adopted an "effect-only" standard similar to those adopted in Black Jack and Rizzo.8 9 In addition, the First Circuit has adopted a standard which
resembles the "effect only" standard. 90 By contrast,
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have retained the
"four-factors" standard first applied in Arlington II and
Clarkton.91The Sixth andTenth Circuits have adopted
a "three-factor" standard which expressly omits any
consideration of discriminatory intent. 9 The Ninth
Circuit has yet to determine, conclusively, which standard will apply. 93 Finally, despite its initial decision
in Rizzo, recent opinions suggest that the Third Cir-

1116-17. In the case before it, against a private defendant, the
court noted that the plaintiffs"had provided both extensive
proof of discriminatory effect as well as circumstantial evidence suggesting defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.
Id. at 1118. Based on this evidence of both effect and intent,
the court granted plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1119.
88 Id. at 1115-16. The "four-factors" standard also makes
such a distinction between private and governmental defendants, -but does not explicitly require proof of discriminatory
intent in either situation. See supra Section II(C) (discussing
the Arlington II factors).
9See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819
F.Supp. 1179, 1182 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (2d. Circuit); United
States v. Mitchell, 580 E2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); Oxford HouseC v. City of St. Louis, 843 F.Supp. 1556, 1577 (E.D. Mo.
1994)(8th Cir.); Familystyle of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul, 728
F.Supp. 1396, 1303-04 (D. Minn. 1990), afPd 923 F.2d 91
(8th Cir. 1991).
90See CasaMarie,988 F.2d 252,269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1983)
(outlining the four considerations to be considered when analyzing a Fair Housing claim, the first being that the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing that the defendant's actions caused
a disparate impact on the members of a class protected by
Title VIII). See also United States v. Grisham, 818 F.Supp. 21,
23 (D. Me. 1993).
91See Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery
County, Maryland, 823 F.Supp. 1285, 1295-96 (D. Md. 1993)
(4th Cir.); Burrell v. City ofKankakee, 815 E2d 1127, 1131(7th
Cir. 1987).
92
See Arthur v.Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986)
(excluding proof of intent as a factor); Mountainside Mobile
Estates v. Secretary of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995).
93
See supra Section II(A).

cuit may be wavering in its acceptance of the "effectonly" standard.94
III. AUTHORITY RELEVANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE PRIMA FACIE
STANDARD
In determining the appropriate primafacie standard
to be applied to disparate impact claims brought under
the FHA, courts have cited a variety of sources to support their conclusions. The following sections summarize these sources of authority.

tent while reading the language broadly would permit a
standard of effect or intent.98 Arlington II held that the
language should be interpreted broadly in order to permit the finding of a statutory violation based on proof of
discriminatory effect in certain circumstances.99 Similarly, the courts in Black Jack and Rizzo concluded that a
violation of the Fair Housing Act could be shown by
proof of discriminatory effect.'00 Finally, commentators
and courts alike have cited the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of identical language found in Title VII as
support for the adoption of a similar interpretation in
Title VIII cases. 01 In summary, the phrase "because of
race" has been interpreted to implicate more than ac-

A. Interpretationof the Phrase"Because of Race"

tions taken with discriminatory intent in other contexts,
and nothing in the language of the FHA suggests that

Section 3604 (a) of the Fair Housing Act states that

the interpretation of this phrase should be any different
under Title VIII.

"it shall be unlawful ... [t]o refuse to sell or rent after

the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate
for the sale or rental of,or otherwisemake unavailableor

deny, a dwelling to any person because ofrace, color religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."95 Despite
the apparent importance of the phrase "because of race"
in interpreting the scope of the statute's application, the
FHA does not explicitly define this phrase or the appropriate standard of proof necessary to sustain a statutory
violation. 96 Therefore, courts and commentators have
intepreted this language using other sources of authority in order to determine the appropriate standard of
proof In particular, most court and commentators have
identified the phrase "because of race" as the key phrase
for discerning the appropriate level of proof required to
find a FHA violation. 97
As the Arlington II court explained, reading this language narrowly would require a standard of actual in-

94

Compare Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d

122, 148 n.32 (3d. Cir. 1977) (rejecting application of the
"four factors" inquiry) with Congdon v. Strine, 854 ESupp.
355, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (3d. Cir.) and Horizon House v.
Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F.Supp. 683,697 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (3d. Cir.), aff'd 995 F.2d 217 (1993) (without publishedopinion) (accepting and applying the"four factors" analysis as applied in Arlington Heights 11). Despite recognizing that
the Rizzo framework was still controlling within the Third Circuit, see Congdon, 854 F. Supp. at 361 n.2, the district court
in Congdon chose to utilize the "four-factors" standard to guide
its analysis of the FHA claims before it. Id. at 361 The author
is not certain what impact the Congdon court's analysis or the
court of appeals' unpublished affirmation of Horizon House
have had on the validity of the Rizzo opinion within the Third
Circuit.
9542 U.S.C. §3604 (a) (1994) (emphasis added). See supra
note 4 (identifying the other sections of the FHA containing
the identical or similar language).
96 See supra note 7.
97
See SCHWEMM, supra note 4, at 58 (discussing the sig-

nificance of the "because of race" lan guage).

B. Legislative History of the FairHousingAct

Many federal courts have held that the FHA should
be interpreted broadly.02 Supporting this belief, these
courts frequently cite the FHA's statement of purpose,
which dedares that Congress intended the FHA "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States."10 3 Unfortunately, the legislative history of the FHA provides little authority to
support further conclusions regarding the proper scope
of the statute. The court in Resident Advisory Board v.

Rizzo, along with at least one commentator, have noted,
however, the discussion surrounding an amendment,
proposed during the intitial Senate debates over the
FHA, which would have required plaintiffs to offer proof
of discriminatory intent in order to establish violations

"Arlington II, 558 F.2d at 1288.
99 See id. at 1289 (declining to interpret the "because of
race" language narrowly). See also Bjom, supranote 80, at 62223 (discussing the treatment of the"because of race" language
by the Arlington I and Rizzo courts; Schwemm, supra note 10,
at 202-07;
Stick, supra note 10, at 400-07.
0
1'
See supra Sections II(B)(1) & (2).
101
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The
Griggs court interpreted such language to prohibit employment practices that had discriminatory effects on individuals.
Id. at 435-36. See also Sc1wariM, supra note 4, at 58-59.
'See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 (citing with approval both
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII)
and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
211 (1972) (Title VIII) standing for the proposition that both
Title VII and Title VIII should be construed broadly so as to
end discrimination; Arlington I, 558 F.2d at 1289 (citing the
conclusion by several courts that the Fair Housing Act should
be interpreted broadly in order to effectuate the intent of
Congress).
10342 U.S.C. §3601 (1994). See, e.g., Arlington II, 558 F.2d
at 1289; Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1183.

of the FHA. "1 However, the amendment was defeated
after a heated debate on the Senate floor. 0 s
With that exception, much of the FHAs legislative
history suggests that Congress was not as keen on adopting the legislation as the statute's rather broad purpose
statement would suggest. Earlier attempts by the Senate to adopt fair housing legislation failed in both 1966
and 1967.106 Only through constant political pressure
from President Johnson was the eventual EHA legislation even introduced in Congress in 1968.07 Although
the Senate did adopt the President's FHA legislation in
1968,108 the corresponding legislation in the House progressed slowly, and seemed headed for eventual demise
in the House Rules Committee in the Spring of 1968.1'9
Sadly, several commentators have suggested that it was
only because of the sudden assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King on April 8th, 1968 that rising conservative
fervor in opposition to the legislation was quelled long
enough for the legislation to be adopted by the House.' 0
Two days following Dr. King's death, the House passed
the FHA bill."I Thefollowing day, the President signed
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 into law. 2 The often
contentious and eventual emotionally-charged birth of
the FHA probably provides comparable evidence to support both a broad and a narrow interpretation of the
FHA. By comparison, recent CongressionalAmendments
1' See Rizzo, 564 E2d 126, 147 (citing 114 Cong. Rec.
228, 3421 (1968) (discussing the significance of an amendment proposed by Senator Baker, which would have required
proof of discriminatory intent in order to establish a violation
of the FHA); Elliot M. Mincberg, Comment, Applying the Title
VII Prima Facie Case To Title VIII Litigation, 11 HAnv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 128, 144 (1976) (discussing the legislative history of the FHA).
"'sSeeRizzo at 147 (citing 114 Cong. Rec. 5221-22 (1968)).

106 See Lamb, Charles M., Congress,The Courts And Civil
Rights:The FairHousingAct of 1968Revisited, 27 VLL. L. Rav.

1115, 1124 (1981-82) (describing Senate's attempts to adopt
fair housing legislation). Seegenerally Dubofsky, Jean Eberhart,
FairHousing: A Legislative History And A Perspective, 8
L. J. 149 (1969) (detailing the legislative history of
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the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (FHA)).

0
1'
See Lamb, supra note 105, at 1120, 1121 (highlighting

the leadership and persistance of President Johnson in his efforts to pressure Congress into adopting fair housing legislation).
'08 See id. at 1125 (discussing the eventual passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 by the Senate).
1'9See Dubofsky, supranote 105, at 160 (1969) (describing the activity in the House regarding the FHA legislation).
""Lamb, supranote 105, at 1126. See also Dubofsky, supra
note 105, at 160 (crediting the tragic assassination of Dr. King
with having provided the necessary momentum in the House
to adopt the FHA legislation).
S"See Dubofsky,supranote 105, at 160; Lamb, supranote
105, at2 1126.
" See Dubofsky, supranote 105, at 160; Lamb, supranote
105, at3 1126.
" See National Housing and Community Development

to the FHA have reflected the more unequivocal support of Congress for a broad, more far-reaching FHA.
Since its initial adoption in 1968, Congress has enacted
several amendments expanding the substantive provisions of the FHA.11 3 The adoption of these amendments
seemingly reflects Congress' interest in expanding, rather
than limiting, the scope of the FHA.
C. The PrimaFacie Showing Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act

In seeking to interpret the Fair Housing Act, courts
and commentators have relied on the judicial interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a civil
rights statute similar, in form, to Title VIII, which addresses discrimination in employment.' 14 Such comparisons are appropriate for several reasons. Foremost, both
pieces of legislation also share a common purpose in that
they were enacted to eliminate the effects of invidious
discrimination.'" In addition, Title VII also contains the
"because of race" language." 6While the Supreme Court
has yet to interpret such language in the Title VIII context, it has interpreted such language, at least implicitly,
under Title VII.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," 7 the Supreme Court

analyzed the scope ofTitle VII, implicitly addressing the
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, §808(b)(1), 88 Stat 633,
729 (adding "sex"to the list of protected characteristics under
the FHA); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-430, §13(a), 102 Stat. 1619, 1636 (adding "familial
status" to the list of protected characteristics under the FHA).
"' See, ag., BlackJack, 508 E.2d at 1184;Arlington II, 558
E2d at 1289; Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; MErcA.F, GEORGE R.,
FAIR HousING COMES OFAGE 124 (1988); ScHwEMm, supranote
4, at 58; Mincberg, supra note 103, at 158-160.
"s See, eg., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (stating objective
of Congress in enacting Title VII was "to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees"); Schwemm, supra note 10, at
215 (discussing the purposes of Titles VII and VIII); Mincberg,
supra note 103, at 158-60 (discussing the reasons for interpreting6 Titles VII and VIII similarly).
" Section 2000e-2(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
states:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -

(1)to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
"7401 U.S. 424 (1971).

interpretation of the phrase "because of race."' 8 To determine the statute's scope, the Court considered the
underlying purpose of Title VII as stated by Congress." 9
From this purpose, the Court determined that Congress
intended for the statute to combat the "consequences of
[discriminatory] employment practices, [and] not simply the motivation [of employers] ."120 Additionally, the
Court noted the opinion of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the agency charged with enforcing Title VII, which supported interpreting the statute broadly' 2' For those reasons, the Court concluded
that the language of Title VII should be interpreted liberally, in order to permit plaintiffs to prove a statutory
violation without proving intentional discrimination.'2
D. Comparison of the PrimaFacieStandard
Under the Equal ProtectionClause
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff must make a showing of intentional discrimination in order to prove a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 123 In other words, the prima facie
showing in an equal protection case required proof of
discriminatory intent. This holding was reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.v. VillageofArlington Heights.'2 4 Significantly,
while the Arlington case also involved a FHA claim, the
Supreme Court did not address the question of whether
discriminatory effect would be sufficient to establish a
FHA violation.' s Rather, the Court remanded the quesIIs See Griggs v.Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433, 43536 (1971) (discussing the appropriate interpretation of Title

VII). In Griggs,the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the defendant's requirement that employees
possess a high school diploma and pass an intelligence test were
permissible under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.

at 425-26. Defendants claimed the requirements were permissible because they were not intended to discriminate on

the basis of race. Id. at 433. The Court responded that Title
VII addressed both the motivations and the consequences of

employment practices. Id. at 432. Based on this conclusion,
the Court held that the use of discriminatory employment

practices would be upheld only where the practices were shown
to be "job related." Id. at 436.
19 Id. at 431. The Court noted that Title VII's was enacted to "remove .. artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate[d] invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification."
Id.
201d. at 432.
2 See id. (taking into account the guidelines of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission which permitted only
the use
of job-related tests).
22
' Id. at 436.
12 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976)
(holding evidence of discriminatory intent was required to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

tion for further consideration
by the Seventh Circuit
26
Court of Appeals.
Courts and commentators have noted that the Supreme Court's decision not to determine the appropriate primafacie standard under the FHA while deciding
the appropriate standard under the Equal Protection
Clause suggests that the Court intended for the two standards to differ. 27 Moreover, commentators comparing
the proper analysis of claims under the Equal Protection Clause and the FHA have noted that both the legislative history of the FHA and subsequent judicial interpretation suggest thatTitle VIII was meant to be more
expansive than the Equal Protection Clause.2 8 To the
extent that these views are accurate, they support the
assertion that the appropriate standard of proof under
the FHA should be more liberal than the corollary equal
protection standard.
IV. DOES THE STANDARD REALLY MATTER?
As Section II(D) reveals, there is a split among the
federal circuits regarding the appropriate primafacie formulation to be applied to FHA claims. Not as clear, is
whether this split really matters. After all, the divergence
in approaches first appeared some twenty years ago and
has yet to be resolved in any conclusive fashion. Further, as early as the Third Circuit's opinion in Resident
Advisory Board v. Rizzo, courts have suggested that the
"four-factors" and ihe "effect-only" standards are not that
different.'2 9 In addition, while adopting different lan124 Village of Arlington Heights v.Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation (Arlington1),
429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(stating "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause").
121ld.
26

at 271.

Id. (instructing that the question of whether a violation of the Fair Housing Act can be predicated solely on a
showing of discriminatory effect be considered on remand).
,.27See,Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (concluding that the Supreme Court's remand of the FHA in Arlington I suggests the
Court intended for the constitutional and statutory prima fa.
cie standards to be different); Bjom, supra note 80, at 625
(discussing the Rizzo opinion's analysis of Arlington 1).
'28See, Mincberg, supra note 103, at 145 (comparing the
scope ofTitle VIII with that of the Equal Protection Clause).
12 9 See Rizzo, 564 E2d at 148 (suggesting that the "fourfactors" standard, as applied by the Seventh Circuit in Arlington II,
"required no more than we do in order for a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case, i.e., . . . a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory intent"). The
court went on to state that while the two standards appeared
different, it did not believe that the Seventh Circuit was altering the "effect only" primafacie standard. Id. at 148. Rather,
Arlington II was simply "setting forth a standard upon which
ultimate Title VIII relief may be predicated . I.."
Id.

guage to express their standards, the courts in Rizzo,
United States v. City of Black Jack, and Arlington II all
claimed to embrace the same foundational proposition:
that evidence of discriminatory effect could be sufficient
to establish a FHA daim.' 30 Finally, at least one prominent FHA scholar has suggested that while the standards
appear to propose different methods of analysis, the results produced by the application of the two might not
be terribly different.' 3' All of this evidence suggests that
the difference in standards does not matter.
However, several more recent cases support the
opposite conclusion. At least one court, applying the
"four-factors" standard in order to assess the merits of a
FHA claim, was able to use the standard to limit the
scope of the correlative prima facie standard. A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in another case supports the conclusion that the two standards can produce different outcomes when applied to
the same facts. Finally, a third opinion provides a compelling explanation of how to use the "four-factors" standard in assessing the merits of a FHA claim while preserving the broad standard created by the "effect-only"
primafade approach. These three propositions, and the
cases that support them, are discussed in the following
sections.
A. Narrowingthe Scope of the PrimaFacie Case:
Arthur v. Toledo

Some courts and commentators have suggested that
the court in Arlington II intended for the "four-factors"
standard to be used in assessing the merits, rather than
the primafacieevidence, in FHA claims. 32 However, even
where the "four-factors" standard is applied in such a
manner, its application has still provided courts with a
means of narrowing the scope of the prima facie standard. In Arthur v. Toledo,'33 the plaintiffs brought a class
0
See
13

Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065

(comparing the opinions in Rizzo, Black Jack, and ArlingtonII).
13'
See Schwemm, supranote 10, at 257 (concluding "[t]he

difference in these two methods of analyzing an effect case
under Title VIII may not be particularly significant in terms of
producing difference results). But see Stick, supranote 10, at
398,407-08 (examining the differences between ArlingtonII's
"four-factor" standard and the "effect-only" standards adopted
by Black Jack and Rizzo).
132 See, eg., Huntington Branch, NAACP v.
Town of Hun-

tington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d. Cir. 1988); Stick, supra note
10, at 410 (describing Arlington IHfactors as a standard for
determing the outcome of a Title VIII case).
133 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986).
1SeeArthurv.Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 577 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding defendants, in submitting a key ordinance for approval
by referendum, did not violate the FHA,despite plaintiffs
claims that the decision to hold a referendum was motivated
by racial bias). In Arthur,the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision below, which held for the defendants on

action suit alleging that Toledo city officials were guilty
of various constitutional and statutory violations, including violation of the FHA.13 4 The defendants had been
negotiating with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to build two new
35
housing projects outside of Toledo's inner-city area.
City officials determined that in order to proceed with
construction of the housing project, a sewer extension
would have to be built connecting both sites with existing lines. 36The City Council held two votes on the sewer
ordinance, defeating the ordinance on the first vote and
37
passing it on the second.
Following the second vote, those council members
opposed to the adoption of the ordinance petitioned the
council to hold a public referendum to challenge the
council's vote. 3 The City Council approved their request and held such a referendum. 3 9 As a result, the
voters repealed the ordinances by an overwhelming
margin, effectively preventing the completion of the
housing projects. 40 The plaintiffs then brought suit alleging that the decision by the council members to petition for a referendum was motivated by discriminatory
intent, and that the outcome of the referendum had a
discriminatory effect on those minority applicants seek-

ing homes in the -housing projects. 1"

In its review of the plaintiffs FHA claims, the court
of appeals accepted the proposition that evidence of discriminatory effect, without proof of intent, could suffice to establish a FHA violation. 4 However, the court
qualified this statement by adding that not every action
producing such an effect would be found violative of
the statute. 43 With this in mind, the court adopted the
multi-factored approach of Arlington II, but chose to
consider only three of the four Arlington II factors.'44 The
court refused to consider evidence of discriminatory intent in its analysis of the plaintiff's disparate impact
claims, arguing that if such evidence was not sufficient

all counts. Id. at 568. Plaintiffs alleged defendant's acts violated the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, and the Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution, The Fair Housing
Act, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, & 1983. Id. at 566. The
court of appeals determined that a "three-factor"standard based
on the Arlington II standard should be utilized to analyze the
plaintiffs' FIA daim. Id. at 574. The court omitted consideration of any evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. Applying
this standard, the court affirmed the district court's holding
that no FHA violation had occurred. Id. at 575.
135Id. at 567.
1361d.
137

38

Id.
1d. at 568.

139 Id.
40
1 Id.
41

Id.
142 Id. at 574.
1

13 See id. at 575 (citing Arlington II, 558 F.2d at 1290).
144 Id.

to maintain a claim based on disparate treatment, then
the plaintiff should not be permitted to receive "partial
credit" for its use elsewhere. 4 Applying these "three
factors", the court concluded that the district court was
correct in 46holding that the defendants did not violate
the FHA.'

While the opinion of the court of appeals focused
on review of the district court's assessment of the merits, its analysis also impacted the scope of theprimafacie
standard in future disparate impact cases challenging the
use of referenda. In determining that there was no FHA
violation, the court of appeals based its decision entirely
on its analysis of the third Arlington II factor, which required consideration of the defendant's interest in taking the challenged action. 47 In its earlier discussion of
referenda, the court had determined that it should only
inquire into the motivation of the electorate during public referenda in rare circumstances 48 In the absence of
such circumstances, courts should not make such an inquiry.149 Therefore, except in rare cases, the court concluded that because of this limitation, "the discriminatory effect of a referendum [could not] establish a violation of the FHA."15°
This holding by the court effectively eliminated the
availability of the "effect-only" prima facie standard to
plaintiffs challenging the results ofpublic referenda since
such evidence, under the court's holding, would not suffice to establish a FHA violation. Therefore, through its
use of the "four-factors" standard to review the merits of

a FHA claim, the Arthur court was able to narrow the
scope of the "effect-only" primafacie standard.
145Id.
1461d.
147Id.

148 See id. at 573 (discussing the ramifications of examin-

ing "the factors motivating the electorate in a public referendum) 49
1 Id.

150Id.

s'56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995).
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"sSee Mountainside

Mobile Estates v. Secretary of Hous.

& Urban Dev. (HUD), 56 F.3d. 1243, 1252 (holding that
defendant's occupancy restriction did not violate the FHA
because defendant was able to rebut plaintiffs primafacie evidence with a legitimate justification). InMountainside,defendant appealed the ruling of an Administrative Law Judge, as
affirmed by the Secretary of HUD, which enjoined the
defendant's use of a three-person occupancy restriction. Id. at

1246-47. In particular, the defendants challenged the AUL's
conclusion that a violation of the FHA could be supported
merely by evidence of discriminatory effect. Id. at 1247. Applying a "three-factors" test, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that despite the plaintiffs primafacie evidence, defendant
successfully rebutted plaintiffs claim. Id. at 1257.

1See id. at 1257 (citing Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
943 F.2d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 1991).
"s'Id.at 1252 (stating "[f]or purposes of this opinion, we
shall assume... that aTitle VIII plaintiff may establish a prima

B. The Standards Compared: Mountainside Mobile
Estatesv. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
In MountainsideMobile Estates v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,'5' the plaintiff challenged a
restriction imposed by the owners of a mobile home park
which limited the occupancy of all mobile homes within
the park to three persons.52 The case provided the Tenth
Circuit with its first opportunity to consider the appropriate standard to be applied to disparate impact claims
brought under the FHA. In an earlier case, the court
had held that evidence of a significant discriminatory
effect could be sufficient
to establish a disparate impact
53
claim under Title VII.
Accepting that premise for the Title VIII claim before it, the majority in Mountainside assumed that the
government had established a primafade case with its
statistical evidence."' The court also noted that under
the "effect-only" formulation, once aprimafacie case was
established, the defendant bore the burden of justifying
the challenged actions. 55 However, instead of considering the such rebuttal evidence, the court first applied
the "three-factors" variation of the Arlington II standard
to assess the weight of the plaintiff's discriminatory effect evidence.'-s Under this "three-factors" analysis, the
court concluded that the plaintiff's evidence of discriminatory effect was particularly weak.5 7 Having diminished

the plaintiff's primafaciearguments through its application ofthe "three-factors", the court then considered the
defendant's evidence in rebuttal.5 " While spending some
time determining the appropriate rebuttal standard,""
facie case of discriminatory impact by proof of national statistics relative to U.S. households as presented here). The court
cited Rizzo for the proposition that "a Title VIII prima facie
case, once established, as here, could alone suffice to prove a
Title VIII violation unless the defendants justify the discriminatory effect which has resulted from their challenged actions".

Id.

'I1d. at 1252.
6 Id. As stated in the text, the majority assumed that

plaintiffs evidence of discriminatory effect did establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under the FHA. Id. However, claiming to assess the merits of the plaintiff's claims, the court then
applied the "three-factors" standard adopted earlier by the Sixth
Circuit in Arthur to determine whether the "plaintiff's prima
facie case of disparate impact [made] out a violation of Title
VIII. Id. This analysis was taken prior to, and separate from
the consideration of the defendant's rebuttal evidence. See id.
at 1254 (considering defendant's rebuttal evidence).
"'Id.at 1253.
'Id. at 1254.
"'Id.The court decided to apply a "manifest relationship" rebuttal standard, gleaned from the Title VII "business
necessity" rebuttal standard, rather than the more difficult
"compelling need or necessity" standard that the Secretary had

applied below. Id.

the court ultimately held that the defendant's had sufficiently rebutted the plaintiff's daims.'s For this reason,
the court of appeals reversed the earlier decision
by the
6
HUD Secretary and found no FHA violation.1 1
By contrast, the dissent in Mountainsidedid not apply the multi-factored standard in its analysis of the
plaintiffs FHA daim.162 The dissent emphasized that
evidence of discriminatory effect alone should suffice to
satisfy the plaintiffs primafacie burden. Once that burden has been met, the defendant must rebut such evidence.6 Unlike the majority, however, the dissent did
not utilize the Arlington II factors to assess the plaintiff's
primafacieevidence. Rather, the dissent appears to have
weighed the evidence presented from both sides, concluding that the plaintiffs did offer sufficient evidence
of a FHA violation and that the defendant failed to sufficiently rebut that evidence. 164 Therefore, the dissent
determined that the Secretary's finding of a FHA viola65
tion should be affirmed.1
This divergence in the results produced by the majority and the dissent, supports the proposition that the
use the "effect-only" and "four-factors" standards can
produce different results when applied to the same case.
The majority in Mountainside used the Arlington II factors to diminish the prima facie evidence provided by
the plaintiff Under the "effect-only" approach applied
by the dissent, the weight of the plaintiff's evidence was
preserved. Further, by applying the Arlington H factors
prior to assessing the defendants rebuttal evidence, the
majority reduced the distinction between using the standard as aprimafaciestandard or as a "merits" standard to
one of semantics. Under either label, the plaintiff's case
was lost at the prima facie stage, before the defendant's
evidence in rebuttal was considered. Thus, the majority
was able to use the multi-factors analysis to narrow the
scope of the primafacie standard, and in turn the FHA.
160Id. at 1257.
161
Id.
161
Id. The

dissent emphasized that evidence of discriminatory effect, without more, was sufficient to establish a prima
fade case of housing discrimination. Id. (citing Betsey v.Turtle
Creek, 736 E2d 983 (4th Cir. 1986).
'16
See id. at 1257, 1258 (implicitly accepting the rebuttal
concept by contesting only the majority's analysis of the rebuttal evidence and not the use of the rebuttal standard itself).
'4See id. at 1257 (noting that the evidence did support
finding that defendant's policy had a discriminatory effect and
that the defendant's rebuttal evidence was not sufficient to
overcome such a finding).
16Sld.

16844 F2d 926 (2d. Cir. 1988).
167
See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d. Cir. 1988) (holding defendants in violation of the FHA because they failed to justify those actions
which plaintiffs proved created a discriminatory effect). In
Huntington, the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's
holding denying plaintiff relief under the FHA. Id. at 928. Plain-

C The ProperRole of the "Four-factors"Standard:
Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington
In Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington,' 66 the plaintiffs challenged the refusal of the defendants to repeal a municipal ordinance which restricted
the development of multi-family housing projects in a
largely white area.'6 The district court below dismissed
the plaintiffs claims on three alternative grounds, the
second, and most relevant.to this paper, being that under the Arlington II "four-factors" standard, the plaintiffs
failed to establish a primafaciecase of housing discrimination.'6 Reviewing these holdings, the court of appeals
focused on the proper methods for analyzing both the
prima fade burden and the merits of a FRA claim.169
Correcting the district court's analysis of both the facts
and applicable law, the court of appeals held that discriminatory effect, alone, was sufficient to satisfy the
primafade standard for daims housing discrimination.
Finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied this prima fade
burden, the court reversed the district court on the merits
and found the defendants guilty of violating the FHA.170
Though the court quicdy resolved the issue of the
appropriate prima fade standard for disparate impact
claims, the courts subsequent discussion of the merits
provided additional insight into the primafade concept
and the proper use of the Arlington II factors. The court
recognized that the Arlington II factors were useful in
analyzing FHA claims, though not as a primafade standard.' Rather, these factors, among others, should be
considered when assessing the defendant'sjustificationfor
their challenged actions. 72 In particular, the court found
the Arlington II factors useful in characterizing and separating the various types of disparate impact claims before the courtY 3 However, ultimately, the court still
weighed the strength of the plaintiffs prima fade evitiffs alleged that the town's zoning ordinance effectively lim-

ited private multi-family housing projects to "a largely minority urban renewal area" while preventing the construction of
such projects in particular white neighborhoods. Id. at 928.
The district court based its decision on three alternative
grounds, one ofwhich was that the plaintiff failed to satisfy its
prima facie under the "four-factors" standard. Id. at 932. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case under the Rizzo "effect-only" standard, the appropriate prima facie standard. Id. at 934.
68RId. at
169 Id.

933.

"Old. at 941.
7 See id. at 935-36 (warning that "treating the [Arlington
II factors] as steps necessary to make out a prima fade case
places too onerous a burden on appellants").
7 See id. (accepting the relevance of the Rizzo and Arling-

ton II approaches but concluding "[i]n this case, we are obliged
to refine the standard for assessing a Title VIII defendant's jus-

tification somewhat beyond what was said in either [case]").
3
11 See id. at 937 (recognizing, in accordance with the first
factor of the Arlington II standard, that "discriminatory effect.

dence against the defendant's evidence in rebuttal. 74
Based on that balancing of the evidence, the cburt conduded that the defendant had violatedTitle VIlI.175 Thus,
the Huntington opinion offers persuasive insight into a
more appropriate role for the Arlington II "four factors"
standard in analyzing disparate impact claims under the
FHA.
V. CONCLUSION
For the past twenty years, the federal judiciary has
failed to adopt and consistently apply a uniform prima
facie standard to analyze disparate impact claims brought
under the FHA. As this paper has shown, the application of different prima facie standards can be determinative in the outcome of a FHA case. Further, the application of the "four-factors" standard, both as a primafacie
standard and as a guide for the analysis of the merits of
FHA claims can provide courts with a means for narrowing the scope of both the plaintiffs primafacie burden under the FHA and the scope of the statute itself.
Finally, while the "four-factors" analysis has its place in
the proper of analysis of FHA claims, applying it as a
prima facie standard does not necessarily reflect the intent of the court in Arlington II or of Congress' intent in
enacting the FHA.
As this paper's analysis of relevant authorities suggests, Congress intended for the FRA to be interpreted
broadly. This purpose can be gleaned from analysis of
the key language in the FHA, the statute's recent legislative history,the interpretation of similar statutory language in Title VII, and judicial opinions discussing both
the Equal Protection Clause and the FHA. The deci-

*

.

arises in two contexts: adverse impact on a particular mi-

nority group and harm to the community generally by the
perpetuation of segregation").
74
See id. at 940 (stating that "[iln balancing the showing
of discriminatory effect against the import of the Town's justifications, ... we conclude that the strong showing of discrimi-

sions in Arthur,Mountainside Mobile Estates, and Huntington Branch, NAACP suggest that the "effectsonly"primafacie standard best furthers such a broad interpretation.
For these reasons, the "effect-only" standard should
be adopted by all of the courts within the federal judiciary. By doing so, the judiciary will permit more plaintiffs to successfully establish, and potentially remedy,
their claims of discriminatory effect under the FHA,in
turn, increasing the ability of the FHA to diminish housing discrimination in the United States. Such a goal is as
worthwhile today as it was some twenty five years ago,
when President Lyndon Johnson stressed, in a speech to
Congress, that
Segregation in housing compounds the Nation's social and economic problems. When those who have
the means to move out of the central city are denied the chance to do so, the result is a compression
of population in the center. In that crowded ghetto,
human tragedies - and crime - increase and multi-

ply. Unemployment and educational problems are
compounded - because isolation in the central city
prevents minority groups from reaching schools and
available jobs in other areas....
A fair housing law is not a cure-all for the Nation's urban problems. But ending discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing
is essential for social justice and social
76
progress.

natory effect ...
far outweigh the Town's weak justifications').

51d. at 941.
11
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1 See LmAs, supra note 106, at 1124 (citing 1969-1 Pua-

uIc PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNrTED STATES: LYNDON
JOHNSON 116, at 61 (1965).
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